Disgraceland: history and the humanities in frontier country by Cornwell, Gareth
 Disgraceland: History and the Humanities 
in Frontier Country 
Gareth Cornwell 
I 
J.M. Coetzee’s most recent novel has already generated a voluminous and 
various critical response, and – given the fertile indirections of its narrative 
style – it is likely to continue to do so for some time. While most readers 
have noted the realism that characterizes its mode of representation, no-one 
(to my knowledge) has yet addressed the specific issue of why Coetzee 
chose “Salem” as the primary setting for the latter part of the novel. The 
question arises both because Salem is not an invented place but a real one, a 
village about 25 kms from the city of Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape 
province of South Africa; and because Disgrace is a novel whose every 
element seems freighted with symbolic meaning. 
The answer to this question – or part of it – is that for historical reasons, 
the Lower Albany region of the Eastern Cape presents itself as the most 
logical setting for a story concerned at its core with entitlement to the land in 
post-apartheid South Africa. It was in this part of the country that nine 
Frontier Wars were fought between the British and the Xhosa people during 
the nineteenth century.2 Although the specific origins and courses of the 
conflicts varied, the fundamental casus belli was the question of land, and 
the history of the region known to this day as “the Border” (or just “Border”) 
is a history of strife that is everywhere inscribed in the landscape. In 
Grahamstown, for instance, opposing hills on either side of the city seem 
situated endlessly to rehearse a founding moment in the district’s history 
(and, according to Noël Mostert, the country’s history as a whole [479]). In 
the east, Makanna’s Kop, now the site of a sprawling shack settlement, 
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where the forces of the legendary recidivist leader Makanna, or Nxele as he 
preferred to be known, gathered to attack Grahamstown in April 1819. In the 
west, Gunfire Hill, just beyond the beautifully maintained campus of Rhodes 
University, surmounted by the 1820 Monument and the remains of Fort 
Selwyn, from whose lower slopes British cannon bombarded Nxele’s men 
with shrapnel shell and ensured their rout (Mostert 476). It is a moment and 
a history whose “shadows continue to move with unappeased restlessness 
within the haunted house that is modern South Africa” (Mostert xxviii, 
quoted in Coetzee, “Noël Mostert” 338). As if to insist on the inescapable 
presentness of this past, the Eastern Cape Tourism Board has recently 
erected road signs helpfully informing travellers that they are entering or 
exiting “Frontier Country”. Above the words on the signage appears the 
likeness of an old-fashioned field cannon next to a small pyramid of cannon 
balls. There is a rash of such signs in the vicinity of Grahamstown, 
especially on the N2 bypass from Port Elizabeth. Another sign has been 
erected in the very middle of Salem village, where the road from 
Grahamstown takes a left turn towards Kenton-on-Sea: this one displays the 
cannon symbol atop a single word “ENDS” (turning the corner, one is 
welcomed to the “Sunshine Coast”). The placing of the sign is distinctly odd, 
but not without a certain (entirely unconscious) symbolic resonance. 
Salem was the name given to the small valley where the majority of the 
Sephton party of the British settlers halted their trek from Port Elizabeth in 
mid-1820. The name (meaning Peace) was proposed by Rev. William Shaw, 
who quoted Psalm 76: “In Salem also is His tabernacle and His dwelling 
place” (Grahamstown Historical Association [a] 2). No doubt, like the 
naming of Salem in Massachusetts or Oregon before it, this gesture both 
embodied the hope that the remoteness of their new habitation had brought 
these hardy Methodists closer to their God, and sought to secure for them 
His blessing and protection in the face of the many real dangers threatening 
their survival. 
Unfortunately the settlement proved no more successful than any of the 
others established by the English settlers: crops failed repeatedly, livestock 
were lost regularly to disease and Xhosa raiding parties, and the residents for 
decades remained very poor. But in an important sense the village lived up 
to its name: during the first fifteen years of their residence, the settlers were 
never themselves attacked by the “Caffres”. This seemed set to change at 
one point during the Sixth Frontier War of 1834-35, when early one morning 
a large force of some 500 Xhosas made off with the settlers’ cattle and then 
assembled on an eastern hillside, apparently preparing to attack. While most 
of the frightened settlers gathered themselves in a laager in and about the 
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recently built church, one of their number named Richard Gush 
courageously rode out to meet the Xhosas and discover their intentions. 
Gush (1789-1858), a man of Quaker leanings and an avowed pacifist 
(“possibly the only man in the Eastern Cape who had never carried a gun,” 
Maxwell 1), was no stranger to Xhosa depredations. According to the 
anonymous “Life of Richard Gush, an African Immigrant,” 
Some years before the war of 1834, some Caffres stole his team 
of bullocks when he was travelling, and he was so poor that he 
had not money to replace them. He would not however, lodge any 
information before the authorities, lest any armed force should be 
sent after the Caffres, and human blood should be spilled. 
(“The Life of Richard Gush” in Butler, Richard Gush 91) 
If Gush’s response here anticipates Lucy Lurie’s reaction to her rape in 
Disgrace, the resolution of Salem’s crisis in 1835 reinforces the parallel. 
Seeing that he was unarmed, the Xhosas allowed Gush and his translator (an 
Afrikaner named Barend Woest) to approach. Gush asked why they had 
stolen their cattle and were now threatening the lives of the people of Salem. 
The Xhosa captain replied that his people were hungry and had acted out of 
need. 
To this Richard Gush answered, ‘You cannot be hungry now, for 
you have nearly all the cattle in the bush behind you.’ The 
number of these was considerable. The men then said they had no 
bread. Richard Gush pointed to his house, at the door of which his 
wife and children were standing, and said, ‘If you will send one 
of your men, my wife will give him some bread and tobacco, and 
I will stand security for him until he returns.’ The men replied, ‘If 
you will go yourself and fetch it, we will go away.’3 Richard 
Gush then rode back, and soon returned, bringing two loaves of 
bread, weighing about 15lbs., a roll of tobacco of 10lbs. and 
twelve pocket knives. He told the captain to take some of the 
knives to his chief, and tell him that they were sent by one who 
could neither steal cattle nor kill his fellow men, but who, with 
his fellow-settlers, had always been the best friends of the 
Caffres, and should not cease to pray to God that he would make 
them better men. The parties then shook hands, and the Caffres 
went away, and were no more seen in the neighbourhood of 
Salem, which may be justly regarded as given of the Lord into the 
hand of one who dared to trust in him. 
(“The Life of Richard Gush” in Butler, Richard Gush 92) 
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The gift of bread, already symbolic – 15lbs. would not have gone very far 
among 500 men, and bread was in any case at that time not a food familiar 
to the Xhosa – was too much for Guy Butler the playwright to resist: in 
Richard Gush of Salem, he has the Xhosa captain breaking the bread and 
sharing it with Gush, Woest and his own induna (Butler 69).4 But 1820-
settler mythmaking aside, the point is that for Butler, the story of Richard 
Gush understandably “went right to the heart of contemporary South Africa, 
and indeed, of our world: the response of the individual conscience to racial 
and other violence” (Butler, Richard Gush viii). 
The same might be said of the reaction of Lucy Lurie to her violation in 
Disgrace. She declines to report the incident, thereby refusing to sanction 
the prosecution of her rapists; she insists throughout that it remain a “purely 
private affair” (Disgrace 112). It seems that we are being invited to read her 
response as a radical intervention (akin to that of Richard Gush) in the cycle 
of retributive violence which had (or has) for so long defined human 
relations on the ‘frontier’ – an exemplary demonstration of the principle of 
non-violence which for Coetzee is embodied in Christ’s Crucifixion: 
I understand the Crucifixion as a refusal and an introversion of 
retributive violence, a refusal so deliberate, so conscious, and so 
powerful that it overwhelms any interpretation, Freudian, 
Marxian, or whatever, that we can give to it. 
(Doubling the Point 337) 
In updating the frontier in his novel, of course, Coetzee is exploiting a 
central dark irony: the rape of Lucy occurs in Salem, the place of peace 
where the grace of God (for a while, anyway) protected the settlers from 
their enemies. What is more, the occurrence violates the venerable Xhosa 
principle, sanctioned by the fundamental value known as ubuntu, that 
women and children ought never to be harmed in warfare (see Coetzee, 
“Noël Mostert” 334).5 The implication is that Lucy’s attackers are degraded 
men, men who have fallen far from the state of natural nobility in which 
they were found by travellers like John Barrow (see Coetzee, “Idleness” 33). 
Whether one argues that, in the intervening years, white South Africans 
because of their disgraceful conduct have forfeited the right to such 
chivalrous exemption, or that their conduct has helped so irremediably to 
tear the fabric of Xhosa society as to abrogate this foundational precept, is 
immaterial: the point is that in the world of Disgrace, all alike, black and 
white, are “sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy to lift 
[themselves]” (Disgrace 172). (I am of course aware that Lucy’s attackers 
are criminals and not soldiers, but there is no denying that the novel 
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encourages the reader at least to countenance a historical-political 
interpretation of their violence: see, for instance, Lucy’s description of them 
as “debt collectors, tax collectors” [158], calling in apartheid’s dues.) 
Although there are a great many ways in which Disgrace may be read 
and interpreted, there can be no doubt that the novel gains in resonance 
when placed in the context of one man’s exemplary refusal to participate in 
the spiral of frontier violence. 
II 
Coetzee’s well-known essay “Farm Novel and Plaasroman” closes with an 
enigmatic rhetorical gesture. He follows a rigorously anti-pastoral reading of 
The Beadle and other novels by speculating as to “whether it is in the nature 
of the ghost of the pastoral ever to be finally laid,” and notes that his essay 
exemplifies a mode of reading “finely attuned to modes of silence . . . [and] 
alert to the spaces in the text (Where is God? Where is Africa?)” – 
a mode of reading which, subverting the dominant, is in peril, like 
all triumphant subversion, of becoming the dominant in turn. Is it 
a version of utopianism (or pastoralism) to look forward (or 
backward) to the day when the truth will be (or was) what is said, 
not what is not said, when we will hear (or heard) music as sound 
upon silence, not silence between sounds? 
(White Writing 81) 
The passage is an unusually whimsical example of what Teresa Dovey has 
called Coetzee’s  “self-deconstructive mode” of writing (Dovey, “Introduction” 
10). But more than that, it reveals something of the writer’s conflicted 
attitude towards rural settlement in South Africa. Coetzee’s desire for a 
pastoral innocence to be restored to the activity of reading is simultaneously 
a wistful plea for the subjective truth of the feelings towards the land 
articulated in the plaasroman to be recognized. Will it ever be (or was it 
ever) possible, Coetzee seems to be asking, for a white South African to 
express a love for the land uncontaminated by the guilt of colonial conquest 
and dispossession? The question in turn encodes an impossible yearning for 
the individual to be allowed the integrity of a response to his own 
experience not entirely determined by the ethical and political demands that 
are the legacy of South Africa’s troubled history.6 And in Coetzee’s case, 
this response includes a fierce attachment to the South African landscape 
and the simple beauty of farm life, an attachment memorably evoked in the 
autobiographical Boyhood.7  
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But in his fiction, too, both before and after Boyhood, Coetzee has sought 
to imagine an alternative way of relating to the land, a way that does not 
entail the exclusion or oppression of others. In In the Heart of the Country, 
Magda’s efforts to transcend the imprisoning dialectic of master and slave 
fail conspicuously, and yet at the end of her darkly comic anti-pastoral 
narrative she admits that she remains “corrupted to the bone with the beauty 
of this forsaken world,” possessed of an unshakeable “nostalgia for country 
ways” (In the Heart of the Country 138). In Life & Times of Michael K, 
farms are not very different from the camps, parcels of land divided up and 
fenced off so as to privilege some and exclude others. K’s idyllic existence 
“in a pocket outside time” (60) can only be imagined in “forgotten corners 
and angles and corridors between the fences, land that belonged to no-
one” (47), and during his sojourn on the abandoned Visagie farm he is 
intuitively aware that the “worst mistake” he could make would be to 
assume ownership of the property in order “to found a new house, a rival 
line” (104). Later on, observation of K convinces the Medical Officer that 
“there are areas that lie between the camps and belong to no camp, not even 
to the catchment areas of the camps – certain mountaintops, for 
example” (162), and he imagines himself begging K to show him the way. 
But whatever symbolic meaning is attached to the camps and K’s alternative 
way of being, Coetzee himself has pointed out  
how terribly transitory that garden life of K’s is: he can’t hope to 
keep the garden because, finally, the whole surface of South 
Africa has been surveyed and mapped and disposed of. So, 
despite K’s desires, the opposition that the garden provides to the 
camps is at most at a conceptual level. 
(Morphet 456) 
The alternative to both camp and farm, then, is what the novel must be 
content to call “the idea of gardening” (109, emphasis added): and as Rita 
Barnard has pointed out, this is “a new pastoral phantasy: a vision of rural 
life without patriarchal or colonial domination” (Barnard 389). 
The question of whether this vision could ever be more than phantasy is 
re-opened by the plot of Disgrace. The auspices are initially promising: a 
woman, Lucy Lurie, is leading a modest but independent existence on a 
smallholding a mere five hectares in extent (59) – that is, on a piece of land 
a little over a tenth of the size of the paltry 100-acre plots to which 1820 
settlers were entitled in terms of the regulations governing the emigration 
scheme (Makin 57). Lucy is often seen through the eyes of her father, the 
novel’s focalizer, as a latter-day frontier farmer, “a solid countrywoman, a 
boervrou” (60). He finds it “[c]urious that he and her mother, cityfolk, 
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intellectuals, should have produced this throwback, this sturdy young settler. 
But perhaps it was not they who produced her: perhaps history had the 
larger share” (61). Lurie seems determined to situate his daughter in the 
context of an ongoing frontier history: “A frontier farmer of the new breed. 
In the old days, cattle and maize. Today, dogs and daffodils. The more 
things change the more they remain the same. History repeating itself, 
though in a more modest vein. Perhaps history has learned a lesson” (62). 
Well, is history just repeating itself, or has it learned a lesson; and if so, 
what lesson has been learned?  
These questions invite consideration within the context of what Coetzee 
sees as the primary concern of the Afrikaans plaasroman: the “conflict 
between peasant and capitalist modes of production” that ultimately drove 
the majority of Boers off the land and into the towns (Coetzee, “Farm 
Novel” 78). The “programme espoused by the plaasroman” thus flies in the 
face of the historical triumph of agricultural capitalism by imagining “a 
renewal of the peasant order based on the myth of the return to the 
earth” (“Farm Novel” 79). In Disgrace, the modesty of Lucy’s agricultural 
aspirations is evident: in so far as her market gardening amounts to farming, 
she is a subsistence farmer, a peasant. At one stage she explicitly repudiates 
the capitalist (colonial, patriarchal) associations of the word  “farm” in 
South Africa by remonstrating with her father: “Stop calling it the farm, 
David. This is not a farm, it’s just a piece of land where I grow things – we 
both know that” (200). At the outset of the novel, moreover, Lucy has sold a 
portion of her land to her black assistant, intent on translating his status in 
this way from “gardener” and “dog-man” (64) to “neighbour” (116). As 
Lurie reflects,  
Petrus is a neighbour who at present happens to sell his labour, 
because that is what suits him. He sells his labour under contract, 
unwritten contract, and that contract makes no provision for 
dismissal on grounds of suspicion. It is a new world they live in, 
he and Lucy and Petrus. Petrus knows it, and he knows it, and 
Petrus knows that he knows it. 
(117) 
He goes on to characterize Petrus as a “peasant, a paysan, a man of the 
country” (117). Now “African peasant” was John Barrow’s term for the 
white frontier farmer in South Africa, a term that Coetzee has approved, 
arguing that “many of the differences between the frontier farmer and the 
European peasant are more apparent than real” (“Farm Novel” 73). In this 
perspective, Disgrace makes the utopian gesture of imagining “a return to a 
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peasant social order” similar to that envisaged in the German Bauernroman 
of the 1930s (“Farm Novel” 76), staging – in the “new world” of post-
apartheid South Africa – the restoration of a pastoral mythology long 
negated by the forces of colonial capital.8 This certainly seems to be the 
dominant effect of Lurie’s last view of Lucy in the novel: 
She is wearing a pale summer dress, boots, and a wide straw hat. 
As she bends over, clipping or pruning or tying, he can see the 
milky, blue-veined skin and broad, vulnerable tendons of the 
backs of her knees: the least beautiful part of a woman’s body, the 
least expressive, and therefore perhaps the most endearing. 
Lucy straightens up, stretches, bends down again. Field-
labour; peasant tasks, immemorial. His daughter is becoming a 
peasant. . . .  
The wind drops. There is a moment of utter stillness which he 
would wish prolonged for ever: the gentle sun, the stillness of 
mid-afternoon, bees busy in a field of flowers; and at the center of 
the picture a young woman, das ewig Weibliche, lightly pregnant, 
in a straw sunhat. A scene ready-made for a Sargent or a 
Bonnard. City boys like him; but even city boys can recognize 
beauty when they see it, can have their breath taken away. 
(217, 218) 
Rita Barnard notes that this pastoral idyll “is only slightly ironized by the 
reminder that it owes much to the ‘ready-made’ images of Sargent and 
Bonnard” (Barnard 390); it is of course at the same time utterly and 
savagely ironized by the fact that it has essentially been enabled by Lucy’s 
gang-rape and her subsequent decision to surrender her land to her peasant 
neighbour, Petrus. We are obliged to ponder anew Lucy’s earlier, 
unanswerable question to her father: “What if . . .what if that is the price one 
has to pay for staying on?” (158). 
Further irony of varying shades is provided by a return to the history of 
settlement at Salem. July 1820 marked the arrival in the Salem valley of 
Hezekiah Sephton’s party of settlers, Wesleyan dissenters and city dwellers 
all (Makin 31). Apart from a lone Boer obliged to make way for them, the 
area was uninhabited.9  
From the outset, the village was laid out along the lines of peasant 
settlement already largely obsolete in England (see Coetzee, “Farm Novel” 
77),10 with each family allocated a small croft or allotment alongside the 
Assegai Bosch River, within walking distance of a civic centre where 
communal facilities were gradually established (a meeting place for the 
governing committee, a mill, a bakery, a holding prison, a shop and post 
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office). The first few years of settlement were desperate, as wheat crops 
failed and the villagers came to realize that the lime-rich suurveld soil was 
essentially inimical to agriculture. By the end of 1823, only 32 of the 
original 86 families remained, but the lot of those who stayed improved 
gradually with the accumulation of stock and, from July 1824, trade with the 
Xhosas (Makin 50). In November 1823, the colony’s Governor Lord Charles 
Somerset gave official sanction to the transfer to the group of 5,913 morgen 
of land (Makin 57). This was followed in 1836 by a further 2,333 morgen, 
and in 1847, by 5,365 morgen, granted “to the present and future proprietors 
of locations in the Salem Party, being the grazing ground or common land of 
the said party” (Albany Quitrents vol.7 no.67; see “Petition” 1). These latter 
grants, totalling 7,698 morgen, together came to be known as the 
“commonage” and remained the communal property of the residents of 
Salem until the middle of the twentieth century. 
The fall from peasant husbandry into agricultural capitalism began in 
1939, when the erfholders of Salem, with the approval of the Village 
Management Board, petitioned the Supreme Court for permission to 
subdivide the commonage and acquire freehold title to the resultant units. 
The petitioners advanced five reasons for their inability “beneficially to 
enjoy their rights in the Commonage” (“Petition” 2), among which appears 
the following: “Erfholders are unable to keep a good class of stock owing to 
the fact that they become mixed with other and inferior stock and it is 
extremely difficult to avoid disease by contamination either with Erfholders’ 
stock or with Strangers’ stock” (“Petition” 2). Astonishingly, in all the 
recorded history of settlement at Salem, the mention of “Strangers” appears 
to be the first reference to Xhosas as rural co-habitants or neighbours rather 
than as marauding enemies. But of course the reference is indirect, 
anonymous and hostile: “neighbour” is hardly the word the white farmers 
would themselves have used, and in Disgrace the lexically fastidious Lurie 
fixes upon it after some hesitation (116). The black inhabitants of Salem 
valley seemed to have shared the virtual invisibility of colonial domestic 
servants.  
On February 29 1940, the Court duly decided in favour of the 29 
petitioners, with Judge Gane commenting on the anachronism of communal 
proprietorship: “I must say that the position of the commonage-holders in 
this case appears to be very similar to the position of a native tribe holding 
communal property” (“Judgement” 6). By 1949 the surveyors’ work was 
done and the subdivision of the commonage was effected; in terms of the 
idiom Coetzee employs in Life & Times of Michael K, another portion of  
the country had been subdivided and fenced off into “camps”. But what of 
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the “Strangers,” part-time labourers and tenant farmers like Petrus in 
Disgrace, whose inferior and disease-ridden cattle stood accused of 
contaminating the landowners’ stock? The majority lived in a village on a 
piece of the commonage just to the east of Salem, cultivating small patches 
of ground on either side of where the road to Kenton-on-Sea runs today. 
With the new owner enforcing his freehold right, they were expelled – and 
obliged either to become wholly dependent wage labourers on the 
consolidated farms, or to seek work in Grahamstown and elsewhere. As K 
reflects of the inmates of Jakkalsdrif camp, “entire families [were] turned off 
farms they had lived on for generations” (Life & Times of Michael K 79): the 
subdivision of the Salem commonage was an early apartheid-era reprise of 
the consequences of the 1913 Natives Land Act and a rehearsal for 
subsequent removals under the Group Areas Act. A new farmhouse was 
built on the site of the razed village, and the community’s graveyard half a 
kilometre away was simply abandoned to the weather and the bush, with 
little trace of it remaining today. 
This, at least, is the historical narrative advanced by the six “community 
representatives” who in 2001 filed a claim, on behalf of an estimated forty 
families, under the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994. Their claim was 
accompanied by two documents, the first of which is entitled “The History 
of Salem Land”: 
The Salem Land was resided by black people as a community. 
They were farming with cattle and goats and had mealie fields. 
There was no fencing surrounding the land. At a certain time 
white people came in one by one.11 They gave us some seeds to 
plan[t], this resulted in having our own small gardens to plant 
instead of ploughing fields. The people of Salem were ruling 
themselves, they had a mayor, his name was Dayile.  
A subsection of the document entitled “The Land Size” reads as follows: 
“The land starts at Jimsey to kwa-Tyindi, from there to kwa-Don, from there 
to Qhora, from there to kwa-Smoro, from there to Duku, from there to 
Neken and from there to Brein.” A final section, “Land Surveying,” 
concludes: “Surveying of the land resulted to the dismissal of the black 
community. From then on, the white people owned the Salem lands.” 
This document, clearly created from oral testimony, is accompanied by a 
“Motivation” drawn up by the Legal Resources Centre in Grahamstown, 
which reads in part: “The land that [black residents] used was later sold to 
white farmers without their consent and they were forced to offer those 
farmers [their] labour for survival . . . Those who offered resistance were 
intimidated and their lives were threatened.” It concludes: “We believe that 
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we were illegally dispossessed of land and all our rights to it and as such we 
are entitled to a restitution of our rights to this land.” 
Although the portion of land concerned is small, white farmers have 
reacted intemperately. Alleging the claim to be “frivolous and vexatious,” 
they have applied to the Land Claims Commissioner for its dismissal before 
it comes before the Land Claims Court. A decision on the matter is still 
pending. 
What, the reader might well ask, has all this to do with Coetzee’s novel, 
Disgrace? My response would be that historical information of this sort has 
a bearing on the plausibility of and motivation for fictional representations, 
as well as on the nature of their relation to and engagement with the 
discourses of history. And it is consideration of these and other questions 
that in turn helps to establish the significance, however tentative or 
provisional, that as a community of readers we agree to attach to a fictional 
text. Examination of the historical record with which Disgrace seeks to 
compete (see Coetzee, “The Novel Today” 3) forcibly reminds us of some 
awkward facts: first, that Richard Gush of Salem was an eccentric individual 
whose celebrated gesture did nothing to alter the course of history, and that a 
mere sixteen years later there began what Coetzee (quoting Mostert) has 
described as “the most terrible of [the frontier] wars, ‘a war of race, perhaps 
the first of its kind,’” whose conduct attested to “the active, personal hatred 
by now felt by the Xhosa for whites” (Coetzee, “Noël Mostert” 338). It was 
a war, moreover, in which Salem was repeatedly raided and twice gutted and 
sacked. In the long view offered by this history, the attack in Disgrace on 
the Luries, the “personal hatred” (156) that Lucy senses to be animating her 
rapists, is neither more nor less than a resumption of the last Frontier War. 
Coetzee is clearly appalled by an incident described by Mostert, involving 
the then Governor of the Cape, Sir Harry Smith: 
Arriving at the frontier, one of Smith’s first acts had been to force 
a Xhosa chief named Maqoma to prostrate himself. With his knee 
on Maqoma’s neck, Smith announced, ‘This is to teach you that I 
have come to teach Kaffirland that I am chief and master here, 
and this is the way I shall treat the enemies of the Queen of 
England.’ 
(“Noël Mostert” 339) 
One cannot help but see Lucy’s acceptance in the wake of her rape of her 
necessary “Subjection. Subjugation” (159) by Africans as an exact 
reproduction in reverse of this symbolic spectacle of unequal power 
relations.  
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Finally (and I am of course aware of just how reductive it is thus to 
extend the argument), it would have to be said that nobody ‘in reality’ is 
even remotely likely to behave in the way that Lucy Lurie does. The story of 
Lucy very deliberately “rivals” rather than “supplements” that of the 
accepted historical record (Coetzee, “The Novel Today” 2-3). Rita 
Barnard’s description of the function of Lurie’s last glimpse of his daughter 
in the novel is apt: 
Disgrace’s penultimate scene may invite us to imagine the farm 
in the Eastern Cape as a place where the difficulties of cultural 
translation may be overcome, wordlessly, by bodily experiences: 
pregnancy, field labour, the materiality of dwelling on the 
land . . . [thus lending the novel] a muted and vulnerable utopian 
dimension. 
(Barnard 390) 
To the extent that the tableau of Lucy as “das ewig Weibliche” and her story 
as a whole exist outside of history – not in the past, nor in the present nor the 
conceivable future – they offer an ideal or mythical solution to a problem 
that in the real world seems incapable of solution; that is, they offer a 
pastoral solution. 
Approaching Coetzee’s novel via the local history of a small portion of 
what Lurie somewhat inaccurately calls “old Kaffraria” (Disgrace 122) must 
incline the reader toward a pessimistic reading of the sort that Salman 
Rushdie offered in his review: 
Nobody in Disgrace understands anyone else . . . . To the novel’s 
whites, the black inhabitants are essentially a threat – a threat 
justified by history. Because whites have historically oppressed 
blacks, it’s being suggested, we must now accept that blacks will 
oppress whites. An eye for an eye, and so the whole world goes 
blind . . . the novel’s revelatory vision . . . [is] of a society of 
conflicting incomprehensions, driven by history’s absolutes.  
(Rushdie, “A Novel That Leaves Us Blinded”) 
In this vision, the only logical alternative to utter self-immolation is to 
remove oneself physically from the arena where ‘history’ continues to press 
its impossible demands. Coetzee, of course, now lives in Australia, and no 
reader of Disgrace apprised of its context will need to question why. For 
those of us who have chosen to remain – more accurately, perhaps, those 
who have not exactly chosen but nevertheless remain – the “vulnerable and 
muted utopian dimension” (Barnard 390) of pastoral idealism in texts like 
Disgrace will continue to provide a semblance of hope, or at least a 
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semblance of the hope of hope, for rehabilitation from the disgrace of our 
past. 
III 
There is something glib, even meretricious, about the previous sentence, perhaps 
something every bit “as devious, as equivocal, as reprehensible” (Coetzee, 
Barbarians 169) as the pastoral apologia that the Magistrate finds himself 
composing in Waiting for the Barbarians. The rhetorical flourish invoking 
historical guilt seeks but fails to disguise the fact that the sentence as a 
whole is a self-pitying plea for sympathy, a plea that makes implicit appeal 
to the myth of the white English-speaking South African as a marginalized, 
disempowered internal exile (see, e.g., Jacobson, A Dance in the Sun 140-
41; Butler, “The Nature and Purpose of the Conference”;  Watson, “A 
Version of Melancholy”). Stepping thus into the labyrinth of secular 
confession (see Coetzee, “Confession and Double Thoughts”), I shall try to 
make amends by giving serious attention to three related questions that arise 
from the conclusion reached at the end of the previous section: First, what 
exactly is intended by the description of Lucy’s conduct in Disgrace as an 
“ideal” solution to the historical issues of wrong and reparation raised in the 
novel? Secondly, in the light of the novel, what kind of “rehabilitation” can 
white South Africans reasonably expect to achieve? And thirdly, what form 
of “hope” can a reader involved in the reality that Disgrace purports to 
represent stand to gain from reading it? 
I shall approach these questions obliquely, turning initially to David 
Lurie’s darkly comic analogy for his imprisonment in a toilet by Lucy’s 
attackers: 
He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will 
not save him here in darkest Africa. He is helpless, an Aunt 
Sally,12 a figure from a cartoon, a missionary in a cassock and 
topi waiting with clasped hands and upcast eyes while the savages 
jaw away in their own lingo preparatory to plunging him into 
their boiling cauldron. Mission work: what has it left behind, that 
huge enterprise of upliftment? Nothing that he can see.13 
(95) 
Although the joke is directed at himself, the failure of “mission work” is 
nevertheless for Lurie at this moment its failure to ‘civilize’ “the 
savages,” its failure fully to acculturate them to Europe; its failure, in 
short, to turn them into men like himself. In much the same way, his 
course on Romantic poetry earlier in the novel demonstrably fails to 
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make any impact on his “[p]ost-Christian, posthistorical, postliterate” 
students (32). In a parallel of which Matthew Arnold might have 
approved, we are invited to see the demise of the humanities at the newly-
styled “Cape Technical University” in post-apartheid South Africa as the 
secular equivalent of the failure of the ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa – 
always remembering, of course, that the real business of the missionaries 
was (or ought to have been) the salvation of souls, not the cultural 
translation of the natives (however inseparable the two projects came to 
seem). 
These issues are given an airing in perhaps the most complex and 
enigmatic of the Elizabeth Costello narratives that Coetzee has yet 
produced, The Humanities in Africa. In this story, Costello travels to 
Johannesburg to attend a graduation ceremony at which her sister, Blanche – 
now Sister Bridget, a missionary nun – is awarded an honorary doctoral 
degree. The title of the story is the subject of Blanche’s address to the 
university assembly, the history of “studia humanitatis or humane 
studies” (Coetzee, “Humanities” 25), their current standing and likely 
destiny. While the humanities had their origin in textual scholarship that 
aimed at “the recovery of the true message of the Bible” (27), the enterprise 
of interpretation became secularized throughout Europe at the time of the 
Renaissance. For Blanche this was a grave error, for “the True Word . . . the 
redemptive word” is not to be found in the classics, “whether you 
understand the classics to mean Homer and Sophocles or whether you 
understand them to mean Homer and Shakespeare and Dostoevsky” (33). 
She concludes: 
The studia humanitatis have taken a long time to die, but now, at 
the end of the second millennium of our era, they are truly on 
their deathbed. All the more bitter should be that death, I would 
say, since it has been brought about by the monster enthroned by 
those very studies as animating principle of the universe: reason, 
mechanical reason. 
(35) 
Understandably, Blanche’s speech does not go down well with her audience 
of academics. At the subsequent luncheon party, Elizabeth finds herself 
explaining her sister’s argument to an angry lecturer in literature named 
Godwin, who insists that “[t]his is a secular age . . . . You can’t turn back the 
clock” (39). She points out that from Blanche’s perspective, time has 
nothing to do with it: the humanities are of their nature incapable of 
satisfying the essential human craving “that is, in the end, a quest for 
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salvation” (45). When Elizabeth and her sister are alone later, Blanche 
pursues the issue by identifying Hellenism as “the one alternative to the 
Christian vision that humanism was able to offer . . . an utterly idealized 
picture of Greek society” (55). Elizabeth ponders silently on the vision of 
Hellenism: “Free minds in free bodies. An idealized picture, no doubt about 
that. A dream, even a delusion. But what else do we have to live by but 
dreams?” (57). 
It is a thought that might have been endorsed by that great champion of 
the Greeks, Heinrich Heine, but probably scorned by his more literal-minded 
English epigone Matthew Arnold. In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold 
distinguished between Hellenism and Hebraism, the two “great forces” in 
the development of mankind, in this way: “The uppermost idea with 
Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with 
Hebraism is conduct and obedience” (Arnold 165). While both “spiritual 
disciplines” aim at “man’s perfection or salvation” (164), in the vision of 
Hellenism this is to be achieved through freedom of thought enabled by 
“spontaneity of consciousness” (as opposed to “strictness of conscience”) 
(165). Blanche’s argument is that Hellenism could never be the way to truth 
because it was based on a fundamental delusion; moreover, 
[w]hen Hellenism failed – which was inevitable, since it had 
nothing whatever to do with the lives of real people – humanism 
went bankrupt. That man at lunch was arguing for the humanities 
as a set of techniques, as the human sciences. Dry as dust. What 
young man or woman with blood in their veins would want to 
spend their life scratching around in the archives or doing endless 
explications de texte? 
(57) 
Although in the other Costello stories Coetzee’s point of view seems to 
approximate that of his focalizing protagonist Elizabeth (The Lives of 
Animals; “What Is Realism?”), there seems to me to be considerable 
authorial sympathy for Blanche’s sentiments in this extract. Moreover, I 
believe that Blanche’s vision, or something rather like it, a muted and 
inchoate version of it, significantly informs Disgrace, published in the same 
year as the obviously cognate Costello narrative The Lives of Animals, and 
less than two years before Coetzee delivered The Humanities in Africa as the 
von Siemens Foundation Lecture in March 2001. 
In the world of the novel, the humanities are moribund: once the very 
hub of the university curriculum, they are now scarcely tolerated: 
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He earns his living at the Cape Technical University, formerly 
Cape Town University College. Once a professor of modern 
languages, he has been, since Classics and Modern Languages 
were closed down as part of the great rationalization, adjunct 
professor of communications. Like all rationalized personnel, he 
is allowed to offer one special-field course a year, irrespective of 
enrolment, because that is good for morale. This year he is 
offering a course in the Romantic poets. For the rest he teaches 
Communications 101, ‘Communication Skills’, and 
Communications 201, ‘Advanced Communication Skills’. 
(3) 
This paragraph sardonically rehearses the global shift in recent decades 
towards an instrumentalist, technicist, skills-based paradigm for tertiary 
education, given additional point and moment in the South African context 
by the necessity for the post-apartheid “transformation” of educational 
structures. David Lurie “has no respect for the [new] material that he 
teaches” (4) and impliedly regrets the demotion of the canonical Romantic 
literature he has devoted his professional life to studying. Yet as we have 
seen, he is unable to share his appreciation of the poetry with his students, 
who appear to be simply flummoxed by the neo-platonic idealism of the 
passage from Wordsworth’s Prelude to which he tries to introduce them 
(21-23). And among its many other effects, the remainder of the novel 
functions to develop this incipient critique of the relevance of the Western 
Romantic heritage in contemporary South Africa. Out at Salem, Lurie is 
increasingly aware of the inability of the literature he has loved to inform or 
make sense of the world he inhabits (“The truth is, he has never had much of 
an eye for rural life, despite all his reading in Wordsworth” [218]); his 
proposed Romantic oeuvre, a chamber opera on Byron’s last adventure, has 
become a travesty, a comical thing of a monotonous plunking banjo, a 
plaintive refrain and a crippled dog wailing in sympathy (215). Locked in a 
toilet during Lucy’s ordeal, the cartoon missionary at the mercy of vengeful 
natives, Lurie is made painfully aware of the inappropriateness of his 
education: the languages of the Renaissance, Italian and French, serve here 
as a metonym for studia humanitatis in general. In such a context, the ideals 
of Hellenism – the freedom of the sympathetic imagination and the belief in 
man’s perfectibility – are simply a joke. Even the English language has 
become for Lurie “an unfit medium for the truth of South Africa . . . . Like a 
dinosaur expiring and settling in the mud, the language has stiffened” (117): 
Only the monosyllables can still be relied on, and not even all of 
them. 
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What is to be done? Nothing that he, the one-time teacher of 
communications, can see. Nothing short of starting all over again 
with the ABC. By the time the big words come back 
reconstructed, purified, fit to be trusted once more, he will be long 
dead. 
(129) 
In the mean time, however, like the regeneration of English that he 
anticipates in the distant future, Lurie himself has fallen into a process, a 
pattern of change, that will by the end of the novel see him well on the way 
to being “reconstructed, purified, fit to be trusted once more” (129). It is a 
process modeled on Christ’s words for the holy surrender of conversion – 
losing one’s life in order to find it (Matthew 10.39, 16.25; Mark 8.35; Luke 
9.24): “This is not what he came for – to be stuck in the back of beyond, 
warding off demons, nursing his daughter, attending to a dying enterprise. If 
he came for anything, it was to gather himself, gather his forces. Here he is 
losing himself day by day” (121). The new life that Lurie is finding is not 
the outcome of rational thought: it wells up in spontaneous feeling, and it is 
centred in a new respect for and empathy with animals. It begins with the 
affinity he feels for the abandoned bulldog Katy, is amplified by the “bond” 
that “seems to have come into existence” between himself and two sheep 
awaiting slaughter (126), and is consolidated by his work at Bev Shaw’s 
animal shelter: “Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands 
shake. He does not understand what is happening to him. . . . His whole 
being is gripped by what happens in the [euthanasing] theatre” (143). 
Although he reasons that he sees to the decorous disposal of the dogs’ 
corpses “[f]or his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use 
shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing” (146), 
he does not in fact do what he does out of reasoned consideration for an 
ideal or because he believes he is making some kind of useful contribution – 
his work, he concedes, amounts to “little enough, less than little: 
nothing” (220). He does it simply because he has to (cf. Marais, “Impossible 
Possibilities” 11, 13; Attridge, “Age of Bronze” 114-15): “He and Bev do 
not speak. He has learned by now, from her, to concentrate all his attention 
on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer has difficulty in 
calling by its proper name: love” (219). David Lurie is clearly responding to 
the suffering animals in a manner that Michael Marais has shown to have 
strong parallels with Emmanuel Levinas’s theorization of ethical obligation: 
the involuntary assumption of responsibility for the Other consequent on 
recognition of its radical alterity (see Marais, “Impossible Possibilities” and 
“‘Little Enough, Less than Little”).14  
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I wish now to return to The Humanities in Africa before venturing some 
answers to the questions with which this section began. 
In the course of her conversation with her sister, Blanche responds to 
Elizabeth’s point that the aim of the humanities is ultimately “to improve the 
lot of mankind” by arguing that “a secular vision of salvation” is impossible: 
“Rebirth without the intervention of Christ. By the efforts of man alone. 
Renaissance. On the example of the Greeks. On the example of the 
American Indians. On the example of the Zulus. Well, it can’t be done. . . . 
Extra ecclesiam nulla salvatio” (59). 
Elizabeth subsequently travels to Blanche’s mission station at Marianhill, 
where Sister Bridget administers a hospital/hospice for children infected 
with AIDS. Elizabeth sees for herself that “with love and care and the right 
drugs, these innocents can be brought to the very gate of death without 
fear” (63). Unstinting love in the face of death: the parallel with the 
euthanasia conducted in the animal shelter in Disgrace is disconcertingly 
strong. Blanche then introduces Elizabeth to Joseph, an old man who has 
spent a lifetime carving more-or-less identical wooden images of Christ on 
the cross. Obscurely dismayed, she questions him: 
           “Don’t you carve anything else? Animals? Faces? Your 
friends? Ordinary people?” 
           Joseph pulls a face. “Animals is just for tourists,” he says 
disdainfully. 
           “And you don’t carve for tourists. You don’t carve tourist 
art.” 
           “No, no tourist art.” 
           “Why do you carve then?” 
           “For Jesus,” he says. “Yes. For Our Saviour.” 
(67) 
She later raises the matter with Blanche, deploring the waste of a life spent 
“so uncreatively” and asking whether he should not have been “encouraged 
to expand his horizon a little” (69), so as to live a “fuller life” (71). 
Blanche’s answer is lengthy and has both religious and historical 
components. The religious one is the comparatively straightforward question 
of salvation: 
“Hour after hour, day after day, year after year, he imagined 
[Christ’s] agony and, with a fidelity you can see for yourself, 
reproduced it, to the best of his ability, without varying it, without 
importing new fashions into it, without injecting into it any of his 
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own personality. Which of us, I now ask, will Jesus be most 
gladdened to welcome into his kingdom: Joseph, with his wasted 
hands, or you, or me.” 
(71)  
The historical dimension of Blanche’s response, on the other hand, bears on 
the role of Hellenism in the process of colonization, on the fact that the 
Europeans came to Africa bearing the gifts of civilization, education and 
enlightenment, all predicated on the principle of reason: 
“[They] offered the barbarians of the world a false ideal. Throw 
away your idols, they said. You can be as gods. Look at the 
Greeks, they said. . . . Come to our schools, they said, and we will 
teach you to be as gods. In our schools you will learn reason and 
the sciences that flow from reason, so that you can master the 
world. Master disease too, and the corruption of the flesh. We will 
teach you to live for ever. 
      “Well, the Zulus knew better.” She waves a hand toward the 
window, toward the hospital buildings baking under the sun, 
toward the dirt road winding up into the barren hills. “This is the 
reality of Zululand. This is the reality of Africa. It is the reality 
now and it is the reality of the future.” 
(79) 
Africans have chosen Christ rather than the Greeks because, as Blanche puts 
it, “Ordinary people don’t want the Greeks. They don’t want the realm of 
pure forms. They don’t want marble statues. They want someone who 
suffers like them. Like them and for them” (87). Elizabeth Costello has no 
answer to this, and the story ends with Blanche consolidating her triumph: 
“You backed a loser, my dear. If you had picked a different Greek 
you might have stood a chance. The ecstatic instead of the 
rational. Orpheus instead of Apollo. . . . Someone who moves 
among the people, whom they can touch – can put their hand into 
the side of, feel the wound, smell the blood. But you didn’t, and 
you lost. You went for the wrong Greeks, Elizabeth.” 
(89) 
The reader is reminded of Guy Butler’s influential representation of the 
encounter between Africa and Europe as a struggle between Dionysus and 
Apollo.15 In Butler’s vision, the hoped-for result is the mutuality of 
exchange: Apollo brings light and order to Dionysus’s fecund but unruly 
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darkness, and benefits in turn from an access of energy and vitality. Coetzee 
is somewhat less sanguine: in both Disgrace and The Humanities in Africa, 
Apollo, the humanities, the Romantic imagination, indeed, Western 
modernity as a whole, simply have the stuffing knocked out of them. 
Perhaps it is time to return to the questions with which this section began. 
What, in the light of the above, does it mean to describe Lucy’s conduct 
in Disgrace as an “ideal” solution to the historical issues of wrong and 
reparation raised in the novel? While Lucy’s response to her rape and its 
aftermath is not exactly offered as a model of conduct to be emulated, I think 
it may ultimately be mistaken to regard it as existing merely in the realm of 
ideas, in the mythic realm of the pastoral. It can now more clearly be seen as 
a deeply religious response (no less so than that of Richard Gush, though of 
course unauthorized by orthodoxy), and properly “ecstatic” rather than 
rational. Although “ecstatic” is the word that Blanche uses for her preferred 
Greeks, it is deployed here in the sense that Coetzee explores in his essay on 
Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly, to denote that form of holy madness that is “a 
kind of ek-stasis, a being outside oneself, being beside oneself, a state in 
which truth is known (and spoken) from a position that does not know itself 
to be the position of truth” (“Erasmus: Madness and Rivalry” 87). Lucy’s 
ekstatic conduct is prompted not by reason but by feeling, and it seems from 
what she says to her father that she is unable to provide an explanation for it 
in the rational terms that he would understand. It is, moreover, conduct that 
is decisively “outside,” removed from, the dominant frontier tradition of 
violence and retribution; as Coetzee says in the Erasmus essay,  
Such a position . . . is not created simply by declaring oneself 
outside the fray. It becomes available only to the subject who 
declares himself outside the discourse commanded by, and 
commanding, the fray, that is, outside reason, that is, inside a 
certain kind of folly [or madness]. 
(“Erasmus” 94, emphasis added) 
The motif of religious ekstasis in Disgrace is concentrated above all in the 
closing lines of the novel. To the room that he has come to see as the place 
where “the soul is yanked out of the body” (219), David Lurie brings the 
young dog he has become attached to, the one that has responded to his 
banjo playing: 
He opens the cage door. ‘Come,’ he says, bends, opens his 
arms. The dog wags its crippled rear, sniffs his face, licks his 
cheeks, his lips, his ears. He does not stop it. ‘Come.’ 
62     GARETH CORNWELL 
Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery. 
‘I thought you would save him for another week,’ says Bev Shaw. 
‘Are you giving him up?’ 
‘Yes, I am giving him up.’ 
(220) 
There is no way for the reader to understand or interpret this gesture. 
Redolent of sacrifice and self-sacrifice, it appears as a religious observance, 
a ritual prompted by a ‘faith’ that David Lurie has himself not yet begun to 
understand. Through it Coetzee ironically endorses an earlier remark of 
Lurie’s: when asked to demonstrate to the university tribunal “a spirit of 
repentance,” he responds: “Repentance belongs to another world, to another 
universe of discourse” (58) – as, presumably even more decisively, does its 
desired sequel, absolution. Just as Elizabeth Costello’s sister Blanche has 
insisted on the impossibility of a secular redemption (and Coetzee himself, 
in the “Confession and Double Thought” essay, on the impossibility of 
closure to a secular process of confession), we can now affirm – to move on 
to the second and third questions posed earlier – that, in the vision of 
Disgrace, white South Africans can expect no meaningful absolution from 
historical guilt through the mechanisms of the civil state (and these would of 
course include the TRC). Nor can they look to the rationalizing calculus of 
the humanities. Their only hope for shedding the burden of the past and 
dealing with the demands of the present would seem to be ontological: some 
form of self-surrender involving more than just thought (‘penance’?), which 
renders the individual open to an ethical ekstasis beyond or outside of 
history (the intervention of ‘grace’?) (see Attridge, “Age of Bronze” 110, 
116). David Attwell insists on the phrase “below history”: 
since Coetzee refrains from metaphysical discourse, we cannot 
speak of its rising “above history”. Going “below history” means 
entertaining the proposition that given history’s failures, which 
are, in part, the history of the failure of reason, the conditions of 
possibility for the development of a redemptive consciousness 
are, in the first place, ontological. 
(21) 
This is well put, although I find the opening clause of the extract puzzling in 
the context of writing that makes explicit and increasingly frequent 
reference to souls, redemption and salvation.16 Even if it is objected that the 
words themselves are used by fictional characters rather than the writer, or 
that they constitute a convenient metaphorics for a transcendent secular 
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ethics that as yet lacks its own discourse, I would not hesitate to say that the 
fates of the characters in Disgrace (and of Fyodor and Mrs Curren before 
them) are worked out in terms that properly belong in the domain of 
eschatology.17 Thus the hope that Coetzee’s novel has to offer is 
uncanvassed in the studia humanitatis and is in every sense above, beyond 
or below Frontier Country: not social, not political, not historical, not, in 
fact, of this world at all. 
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1. This assertion needs qualification. Grant Farred has written instructively about 
Disgrace’s “border” setting, “a locale where the residues of the past are firmly 
grounded” (17), a “liminal space” beyond the reach of the Constitution where 
“certain transgressions are endured, if not endorsed” (18); in short, a place of 
lawlessness where the real antagonisms within the polity are laid bare for violent 
resolution. In “Coetzee’s Country Ways,” Rita Barnard (see section II of this essay) 
considers the novel’s rural setting in relation to the author’s views on the pastoral 
motif in South African literature.  
2. It is clear from his review of Frontiers that Coetzee accepts Mostert’s view of 
the Frontier Wars as constituting the most bitter and protracted struggle in all of 
South Africa’s bloodstained history (see “Noël Mostert” 338).  
3. This, one gathers from the sources, is a defining moment in the unfolding 
drama: will the white man accept the public humiliation of running an errand for a 
“caffre”? 
4. In Butler’s play, when Gush returns to his homestead and asks his wife for 
bread for the Xhosas, a character by the name of George Dennison interjects: “It is 
not meet to take the bread from the children and give it unto the dogs” (68). This is 
of course mere coincidence, but it is worth just noting how often the equation of 
people and dogs recurs in Disgrace, from Petrus’s wry description of himself as the 
“dog-man” to Lucy’s acknowledgement of the extent of her reduction to “ground 
level. With nothing . . . like a dog” (205). 
5. “In their wars with the colony [the Xhosa] ruthlessly slayed the white farmers 
and their grown sons at the feet of their wives and sisters, but no woman or child 
was deliberately killed in any of the nine wars that were fought with increasing 
bitterness and ferocity, despite the fact that the same chivalrous reticence was not 
always reciprocated by the other side. Missionaries, too, were spared, though 
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sometimes only just. In their magnanimity towards defeated foes and in their self-
control towards women and children even at the height of their stabbing fury, they 
were distinctly different, for example, from the Zulu Chief Shaka’s warriors, who 
were not inclined to make such exceptions.” (Mostert 197) 
6. Impossible, because inevitably constituted by that history and compromised 
by failure to meet its ethical demands. In his “Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech,” 
Coetzee put it bluntly: “[white South Africans’] talk . . . about how they love South 
Africa has consistently been directed towards the land, that is, toward what is least 
likely to respond to love: mountains and deserts, birds and animals and flowers.” 
What this masks is a “failure of love” – a failure to love those whom they have 
conquered – a failure of “fraternity [which] ineluctably comes in a package with 
liberty and equality” (“Jerusalem Prize” 97). 
7. In Boyhood, Coetzee memorably recalls the young John’s love for his uncle’s 
farm, a love so intense that he expresses its meaning to himself in the “secret and 
sacred” phrase “I belong to the farm” (96). But at the same time, he senses that a 
coloured farmworker like Freek “belongs here more securely than the Coetzees do – 
if not to Voëlfontein, then to the Karoo. The Karoo is Freek’s country, his home; the 
Coetzees, drinking tea and gossiping on the farmhouse stoep, are like swallows, 
seasonal, here today, gone tomorrow . . .(87). 
8. The use of several German terms associated with rural life supports this 
association, for example: “She is here because she loves the land and the old, 
ländliche life” (113); “Ettinger is another peasant, a man of the earth, tenacious, 
eingewurzelt” (117).  
9. This is not actually true, as such assertions seldom have been in the history of 
Western colonialism: Bushmen have left evidence of their (admittedly nomadic) 
presence, in the form of some fine rock paintings on the farm known as “The Castle” 
in the Salem area. The Xhosa were at that time north of the Kei river. The wattle-
and-daub shelter left behind by Barend D. Bouwer, the Afrikaner farmer forced to 
move on, became the British settlers’ first meeting place and civic centre. According 
to popular legend, Bouwer did not leave willingly, and: “When on top of the hill 
above Jarret Short’s house, which was then on the road out of Salem, he stopped his 
wagon, clapped a few blomskote with his long whip and reportedly laid a curse on 
the village. He vowed that there would be no happiness or prosperity in the future 
because of the injury done to him. Some have agreed that it has been fulfilled, others 
laugh at the idea and give examples of just the opposite” (Amos 31). 
10. “Salem, with its individual ‘crofts’ and its common rights, is [laid out] 
uncannily like an English medieval village, except that there is no evidence of the 
seat of a feudal lord” (Grahamstown Historical Association [b] 23). In fact the 
Lower Albany settlement of Sidbury affords an even better example of such a 
‘peasant’ village. 
11. It is hard to say when this “certain time” might have been: one suspects that 
this is a fictitious myth of “original” settlement. 
12. In “The Nature and Purpose of the Conference,” Butler describes his 
characterization of white English-speaking South Africans as an “Aunt Sally” (177). 
Pure co-incidence, no doubt, but worth remarking nevertheless. 
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13. The failure of the missionary “enterprise of upliftment” (Disgrace 95), in 
Africa is a recurrent trope in South African literature, its locus classicus perhaps 
distributed between Rev. Andrew Flood’s risible attempts to convert the Korannas in 
Millin’s God’s Stepchildren (see e.g. 40, 43, 55-56), and Rev. Nordalsgaard’s 
wedding in Plomer’s Turbott Wolfe (see esp. 128). 
14. This line of thinking presumably has its immediate origin in the Sartrean 
ethics of Being and Nothingness. My understanding is that Derek Attridge was the 
first to introduce Levinas’s work into the interpretation of Coetzee’s fiction (see, 
e.g., Attridge “Trusting the Other”). Attridge has in this context increasingly 
invoked Derrida (e.g. “Age of Bronze”), while Marais has made fruitful use of 
Blanchot (e.g. “‘Little Enough’”).  
15.  Most memorably, in the poem “Home Thoughts” (Butler, Collected Poems 
124-27) and the essay “The Republic and the Arts”. Butler derives the figure from 
Nietszche’s The Birth of Tragedy. 
16. This turn to “religious language,” the result of Coetzee’s “reaching for a 
register that escapes the terminology of the administered society” (Attridge “Age of 
Bronze” 111), begins in Age of Iron and is perhaps most insistently present in The 
Master of Petersburg and The Lives of Animals.  
17. This contention is not at all undermined in the scene in Disgrace where Lucy 
chides her father for thinking she ought to involve herself “in more important 
things”: 
‘You think I ought to be painting still lives or teaching myself 
Russian. You don’t approve of friends like Bev and Bill Shaw 
because they are not going to lead me to a higher life.’ 
           ‘That’s not true, Lucy.’ 
           ‘But it is true. They are not going to lead me to a higher 
life, and the reason is, there is no higher life. This is the only life 
there is. Which we share with animals.’ 
(74) 
That this is “the only life there is” does not void it of the ethical, nor even of the 
absolute or sacramental: in the perspective of the novel, the demands of the 
Other, of our responsibility to and for other beings, are no less peremptory. 
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